The Supreme Court of the United States in the case Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Laird (400 U.S. 886) declined by a 6–3 vote to grant leave to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to file an original bill of complaint challenging the constitutionality of United States participation in the war in Indochina. Massachusetts, under state legislation passed earlier that year, had sought a declaratory judgment that the U.S. war effort lacked valid congressional authorization, injunctive relief prohibiting any increase of U.S. troop levels overseas, and an order preventing Massachusetts residents from being sent into combat or support duty absent a proper congressional declaration.
The suit was brought against the Secretary of Defense and relied on the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article III, Section 2, Clause 2 of the Constitution because a state was the plaintiff. The Court’s denial of the motion rested on its conclusion that Massachusetts lacked standing and that the issue involved a political question not suitable for judicial resolution.
Justice William O. Douglas dissented, observing that the state’s claim raised significant life-and-liberty concerns for its citizens who might be compelled to serve in an overseas conflict lacking a formal declaration of war. The dissenters—Justices Douglas, Stewart, and Harlan—argued that the merits of the challenge should be heard because the state statute sought to protect citizens from being sent to an undeclared war.
The historical significance of this ruling lies in its affirmation of the judiciary’s reluctance to intervene in war-making decisions and conscription matters. By refusing to hear Massachusetts’ complaint, the Court reaffirmed the principle that the political branches—Congress and the Executive—bear primary responsibility for decisions to deploy forces and conduct military operations abroad. The ruling left unresolved the constitutional question of whether United States participation in the war in Indochina required a formal declaration of war by Congress before ordering citizens into combat or support roles overseas. The case illustrates how legal challenges to major military engagements may be stopped at the threshold by issues of standing and justiciability rather than a full adjudication of constitutional merits.
Another important dimension of the case concerns its impact on state-federal relations in the area of war powers. Massachusetts sought through state law to exempt its residents from being ordered into a conflict absent a congressional declaration, asserting a form of state initiative that resisted federal military policy. The Supreme Court’s refusal signaled that states cannot, by statute, circumvent federal authority to draft or direct citizens into military service overseas. The ruling reinforced the primacy of the federal government in conducting foreign affairs and raising and organizing armed forces under the Constitution, limiting the ability of any state to assert its own legal claim in such matters.
The decision also reflects the broader judicial pattern during the Vietnam War era, when courts repeatedly declined to entertain direct constitutional challenges to U.S. military involvement abroad. The case exemplifies how litigants raising fundamental war-powers questions encountered procedural barriers that prevented courts from reaching the merits. Legal scholars later identified Massachusetts v. Laird as part of a consistent posture of judicial self-restraint regarding national security, foreign policy, and the draft.
The Court’s action on November 9 further highlighted the limits of original jurisdiction in state-versus-federal disputes. The doctrine that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction is exercised sparingly and that states may not easily obtain leave to file complaints against the federal government in matters concerning military operations was reaffirmed by this case. The denial of leave to file meant that the substantive questions Massachusetts raised about the scope of war-making and conscription remained unanswered by the highest court.
In essence, the November 9, 1970 decision in Massachusetts v. Laird stands as a clear example of judicial deference to the political branches in decisions of war and military service. It established that a state lacked standing to bring such a challenge and that the subject was non-justiciable because courts were not equipped to determine the propriety of U.S. military operations abroad. The case contributed to the jurisprudence defining the role of the judiciary in war-making questions and confirmed that constitutional disputes over undeclared wars and state statutes seeking to exempt residents from service would not be resolved in that forum.
References / More Knowledge:
D’Amato, Anthony A. “The Massachusetts Antiwar Bill.” Faculty Working Paper, Northwestern University School of Law. 1970. Available at https://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context=facultyworkingpapers
Schoen, Robert B. “A Strange Silence: Vietnam and the Supreme Court.” Texas Tech University Institutional Repository. 1970. Available at https://ttu-ir.tdl.org/server/api/core/bitstreams/0335e384-7a98-4cac-95f5-bec7f4128b6c/content
“Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970).” Justia Supreme Court Center. Available at https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/400/886/
“Supreme Court Refuses To Rule On Legality Of Vietnam War.” History.com. Published November 16, 2009. Available at https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/november-9/supreme-court-refuses-to-rule-on-legality-of-vietnam-war